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During the next forty years, the Japanese population is expected to go through 
a period of rapid aging. The share of those age 65 or older in our population is 
about  11 percent now,  and the government expects it to double by  the year 
2010. Since most of these people will be retired, their living costs will have to 
be financed either by liquidating their private wealth or by private or public 
income transfers from the working generation. 
In the early 1960s, Japan constructed a comprehensive network of  public 
annuity and health insurance plans. Ever since the hyperinflation following the 
Second World War, however, the national government had to operate under a 
balanced-budget constraint.  Under these  circumstances,  the fiscal authority 
was always wary of expanding the benefits of these plans, for they naturally 
meant more uncontrollable fiscal commitment. As a result, by and large, the 
benefits of  these plans had been kept fairly modest. 
Toward the end of the high economic growth era around 1970, however, the 
general public and politicians discovered the annuities and insurance plans as 
attractive political instruments. They wanted to redistribute more income to 
the elderly, who had not received the full benefits of economic growth, by 
transforming the plans into intergenerational income-transfer mechanisms. Fi- 
nally, under  intense political  pressure,  in  1973 the government made these 
plans pay very generous benefits to the retired without demanding commitment 
for the increased burden from the working generation. 
In retrospect, the aging of  the population had already begun in the 1970s, 
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and the number of those over 65 years old was increasing at the rate of 600,000 
every year, an increase of 50 percent over the preceding decade. It was only a 
matter of time before the inconsistencies between the benefits and the premi- 
ums of these plans began to surface. After the first oil shock, the economy 
no longer grew  10 percent every year, and, almost instantly, the autonomous 
expansion of  these expenditures  helped  send the national  budget into huge 
deficits (figs. 6.1, 6.2). In the lower-house election of  1979, however, voters 
decisively rejected a major tax increase in the form of a European-style value- 
added tax, which might have restored the budget balance. During this time, the 
national debt was accumulating, and, by the early 1980s, the deficit started to 
feed on itself. 
Finally, in the midst of an unprecedented fiscal crisis, the government was 
forced to announce a state of fiscal emergency and to begin to curtail its expen- 
ditures, including these programs. Since 1983, several major reforms were car- 
ried out, which I regard as the first-round  adjustments in these programs. In 
the first half of this paper, I will follow the developments that led to them and 
describe their outlines. Mainly as a result of  these reforms, the expansion of 
government expenditure was brought under control, and the renewed strength 
of economic growth during the last few years is finally restoring the balance in 
the national budget for now. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how much these reforms have accomplished in 
the long run. While some reforms were fundamental reforms that reduced the 
costs of the plans themselves, others simply shifted the national government’s 
burden  to the private sector. Moreover, the long-run outlook for the costs of 
these transfer programs is still an open question. According to the latest gov- 
ernment estimates, the cost of public annuity benefits will go up to 7.5 percent 
of national income in 1986 and to 15.5 percent of national income in 2010. In 
the same period, the cost of public medical insurance benefits will go up from 
7.5 percent of national income to between 9 and 11.5 percent. 
In  the  past,  however,  the  government’s cost projection  had  a  very  pro- 
nounced downward bias, and one must worry whether these figures are biased 
as well. I will provide some insight into the problem by focusing on changes 
in the costs of these programs as a result of the changes in the demographic 
composition over time. The idea is very similar to Laspeyres quantity index, 
with  1986 costs as fixed weights, or the notion of a “current  service” budget 
under constraint prices. 
The design of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I present 
the basic structure of the Japanese public health insurance system and follow 
what took place during the fiscal crisis. In the second section, I repeat the same 
process for the public annuity insurance system. In the third section, I explain 
my population allocation model, which I used to generate demographic vari- 
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6.1  The Public Health Insurance System 
Every Japanese must carry a public insurance plan. When an individual gets 
ill, a doctor will provide medical care as an agent of the insurance plan, follow- 
ing the standard treatment procedure. The procedure is common to all public 
insurance plans and gives detailed instructions on the range of  permissible 142  Seiritsu Ogura 
treatments for each ailment and their costs. A patient  must pay a part of  the 
costs at the doctor’s office and the pharmacy. The proportion varies from one 
plan to another in a range from 0 to 30 percent, but the total cost of insurance 
copayments to a household can be no more than Y60,OOO  @33,600 for poor 
households) during any given month (in  1991). The rest of  the cost will be 
billed to the insurance plan once a month, together with the other patients’ 
bills. To maintain the public health insurance system, the national government 
reimburses  administrative  expenses  and  gives  subsidies  to  weaker  plans 
through many channels. 
In this section, I outline the coverage of four major public health insurance 
plans: (1) Health Insurance Managed by Associations (HIMA), (2)  Health In- 
surance Managed by Government (HIMG), (3) Mutual Aid Association Insur- 
ance (MAAI), and (4) National Health Insurance (NHI). While these terms are 
rather awkward, they are nevertheless used in the Statistical Yearbook of Japan, 
and for this reason I use them also. I should point out that, except for HIMG, 
these are decentralized systems where authorized insurers individually set and 
collect insurance taxes and pay out insurance benefits under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Naturally, uniform rules govern this pro- 
cess, but they do permit plans to provide extra benefits when they can afford 
them, including smaller insurance copayment ratios. 
6.1.1  Employee’s Health Insurance Plans 
A majority of employed workers and their family members are covered by 
plans belonging to HIMA, HIMG, and MAAI; for them, the present coverage 
has probably begun with their employment and will end with their retirement. 
Collectively, all such plans are referred to as employee’s health insurance plans. 
At most, their insurance copayment ratio is 10 percent for the workers, but, for 
their dependents, it is 20 percent for inpatient care and 30 percent for outpa- 
tient care. Roughly speaking, insurance taxes are collected as fixed proportions 
of employees’ wages and salaries, and the employer must pay at least half the 
tax, but may choose to contribute more.’ 
Health Insurance Managed by Associations (HIMA) 
An employee’s health insurance plan can be independently managed by an 
insurance association of a corporation. Under such a plan, membership is lim- 
ited to the corporation’s employees, and insurance coverage is usually limited 
to the members and their dependents. Legally, it is a (public) entity indepen- 
dent from the corporation, but in reality its day-to-day operation relies heavily 
on corporate resources, even though the national government reimburses ad- 
ministrative  expenses.  For  a  corporation  to qualify  for this  plan,  called  a 
Kumiai-Kenko-Hoken, it must have at least 700 employees. As of March 1991, 
there were 1,777 such associations, covering more than 14.7 million member- 
1. The health insurance tax base is referred to as the standard monthly wage, and each worker 
is classified into one of thirty-nine classes, ranging frornY68,WO  toy7  10,000 per month (in 1987). 143  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
workers as well as their 17 million dependents. More than 60 percent of these 
workers belong to associations with more than 20,000 members. 
Each association can set its own tax rate within the range between 30/1,000 
and 95/1,000, of which the employer is required to contribute at least half. In 
1988, the average tax rate of  all the plans in  HIMA was 8.248 percent,  57 
percent of  which was contributed by employers. Since the members of these 
associations are the employees of large corporations, they tend to be healthier 
and receive higher pay than the average worker of the same age and sex. As a 
result, these associations usually  offer better benefits at lower tax rates. In 
many large corporations, for example, surplus funds are used to establish facil- 
ities in resort areas that accommodate employees and their dependents for a 
small cost. Most regard these facilities as effective means for recruiting and 
keeping good workers. 
Health lnsurance Managed by the Government (HIMG) 
Smaller corporations, or most businesses employing more than five workers, 
must join  Seifu-Kansho-Kenko-Hoken, Health  Insurance Managed  by  the 
Government. As of March 1991, this huge insurance plan covered close to 1 
million businesses, with almost 18 million workers and their 19 million depen- 
dents. 
The tax rate is currently set at 8.2 percent, which is shared equally between 
employer and employee. The average HIMG tax base is more than 20 percent 
smaller than HIMA's.  Since it is such a gigantic plan, a change in its tax rate 
used to become a hot political issue when the cost of benefits exceeded the tax 
revenue. Several times in the past, the government had to reach into its own 
pocket to solve HIMG's financial crises, which explains why it contributes 16.4 
percent of the cost of  insurance benefit payments to HIMG, or Y879 billion 
in 1990. 
Mutual Aid Association Insurance (MAAI) 
Most public-sector employees are covered by the health insurance plan man- 
aged by the Kyosai-Kumiai, or Mutual Aid Association (MAA), of the particu- 
lar agencies for which they work. There are 11  8 MAAs for national and local 
government agencies, covering 11.2 million individuals, including dependents. 
Reflecting a wide variance in the employees' age structure, tax rates also vary 
widely among MAAs-that  for the national government is from 6.4 to 11.46 
percent, and that for local governments is 8.868 percent. These costs are split 
equally between employees and the employer. 
6.1.2  National Health Insurance System (NHI) 
Since  1961, the rest of  the population has been  covered by  plans under 
Kokumin-Kenko-Hoken, or the National Health Insurance System. Altogether 
the NHI system covers 43 million individuals, but it is divided into 3,424 sepa- 
rate plans managed independently by municipal governments. More than half 144  Seiritsu Ogura 
of them are relatively small plans that cover no more than 5,000 individuals 
each. In addition, there are 166 professional association plans. 
Currently, among the covered households of the NHI system, about 30 per- 
cent are self-employed workers, while another 30 percent are those employed 
either in very small businesses or only on a part-time basis. About 25 percent 
are households headed by the unemployed or the retired. In the past, the gov- 
ernment has regarded NHI as an insurance system for the poor and has re- 
served for it the highest subsidy rates among public health plans. 
Since 1968, the standard copayment rate for all care has been set at 30 per- 
cent for all members. The government contributes 40 percent of the cost of the 
benefit payments to each NHI plan, and an extra 10 percent of it is committed 
to grants to weaker plans. Each municipal government sets its tax schedule, 
but usually it consists of proportional taxes on (a)  a household’s taxable in- 
come, (b)  its real assetholdings, and (c)  the number of individuals in it, in 
addition to (d)  a flat household charge. In 1990, an average household in the 
NHI system had 1.7 members and paid Y150,OOO for the coverage. Out of this 
amount, 71.5 percent represented taxes on the household’s income, 6.6 percent 
taxes on real assetholdings, 15.4 percent the tax on the number of individuals, 
and 6.6 percent the flat household charge.* 
6.1.3  Aging and the NHI Problem 
Japan’s public health insurance plans are “risk blind”; a person’s insurance 
tax is based only on his ability to pay. A seventy-year-old person may consume 
several times as much medical care as a thirty-year-old person but does not 
pay higher taxes because of it. If  each insurance plan must pay for itself, the 
others in the plan must subsidize the elderly person by paying higher taxes. 
But if the old andor the poor are concentrated in a particular plan, that plan 
may never be able to collect enough tax revenue to cover the standard insur- 
ance benefits. 
Such was the case for the NHI plans. From the very start, since it was a 
system without many younger and healthier people who were in employees’ 
plans, it was a relatively “old” system. It lost more young people during the 
high economic growth period to employee plans as agriculture shrank. Had 
NHI been left alone, it would have been bound for serious financial problems 
as the NHI population kept on aging. The last straw, however, came from the 
influx of a large number of  retired workers from employee insurance plans. 
When an employed worker retires, he and his family usually must withdraw 
from an employee health insurance plan and join an NHI plan. The influx of 
retired employees from HIMA and HIMG is estimated to have doubled be- 
tween 1970 and 1980, from 150,000 to 300,000 persons annually. (Currently, 
it is close to 1 million a year.) 
2. Until the reform of  1984, the national government had been contributing 45 percent of the 
total medical costs of the NHI participants. After the reform of 1984, the rate has been set at 50 
percent of  the insurance payments, which is  said to be equivalent to 38.5 percent  of the total 
medical cost. 145  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
This also meant that the national government had to start paying 45 percent 
of these retirees’ medical bills, the rate it used to subsidize NHI plans. This 
was the long-run cause for the increased costs of the NHI subsidy, but, in 1973, 
the government helped the costs skyrocket by  eliminating insurance copay- 
ments for anyone over 70 years old. Zero coinsurance did not simply mean that 
the national and other governments now had to pay the extra 30 percent of the 
medical bills of these people. It also meant that their bills would become much 
more expensive. 
While there has been ,no firm quantitative analysis yet on the effects of the 
zero copayment policy, apparently this induced the aged to seek medical care 
more often (see Ogura and Futagami 1992), and, more significantly, it induced 
doctors to give them more expensive care, including longer hospitalization. As 
a result, in ten years, the share of national medical expenditures for patients 
over 70 years old has almost doubled, from 11 percent in 1973 to 20 percent 
in 1982. Considering the 50 percent increase in their number, from 4.2 to 6.5 
million, their medical costs have increased 50 percent faster than those for the 
rest of the population during this period. The national government had to in- 
crease its subsidy to the NHI from Y489 billion in  1972 to V2,203 billion in 
1982, in addition to paying V517 billion for its share of the insurance copay- 
ment scheme in 1982.3 
6.1.4 
In 1973, the Japanese economy was shaken by  the first oil shock, and, for 
more than a decade following the shock, economic growth remained sluggish. 
While tax revenues stagnated in real terms from the slowdown, government 
expenditures kept on growing. The national debt continued to increase, and 
soon interest payments became the single largest item in the national budget. 
During the unprecedented fiscal crisis of the early 1980s, there was a national 
consensus that substantial cuts had to be made in social welfare expenditures. 
It was clear that neither the NHI system nor the national government was 
any longer able to cope with the influx of retired workers from the employee 
plans. In order to offset the fiscal burdens that accompanied the influx, the 
government introduced Rojin-Hoken, or the Health Maintenance System for 
the Aged  (HMSA), in  1983, and  Taishokusha-Iryou-Seido,  or  the  Retired 
Workers’ Medical System (RWMS), in 1984. 
The Health Maintenance System  for the Aged (HMSA) 
This system introduced new user fees for the medical care of those over 70 
years old, but so far they are mostly symbolic; the current rates are Y900 per 
month for outpatient care and Y600 per day for inpatient care. With the intro- 
The Fiscal Crisis and 1983 and 1984 Reforms 
3. Actually, after the Ministry of Finance rejected the measure proposed by  the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare in 1969, paying the copayments for the aged became very common among 
municipal and prefectural governments by  the early 1970s. In 1973, finally, the national govern- 
ment decided to take over two-thirds of these costs (i.e., 20 percent of the medical bill), leaving 
the municipal and prefectural governments paying one-sixth each (i.e., 5 percent). 146  Seiritsu Ogura 
duction of HMSA, municipal governments must provide medical care for any 
resident who is 70 years old or older, regardless of membership in an NHI plan. 
The national government contributes 20 percent of  this cost, and prefectural 
and municipal governments are each expected to contribute 5 percent, as under 
the old insurance copayment scheme. 
The remaining 70 percent of the cost is reimbursed by a special fund set up 
to collect the money from every public health insurance plan. Instead of billing 
each plan for the actual costs incurred for caring for its member patients, from 
1990 on the fund will raise the necessary amount by charging each plan in 
proportion to the total number of individuals in the plan (as well as the average 
medical cost of  its aged patients). 
Since the NHI system has a population share of 37 percent, it will have to 
pay only 37 percent of this amount, even though 67 percent of those over 70 
belong to NHI plans. Currently, HMSA costs about Y6  trillion per year, and 
NHI will pay about Y1.4 trillion, instead of the ‘Y3 trillion that it paid prior to 
HMSA. The government subsidy to NHI will be Y0.7 trillion (= 0.5  X  1.4) 
instead of Y1.8 trillion (= 0.45 X 0.67  X 6). 
The Retired Workers’ Medical System (RWMS) 
In this system, the NHI offers reduced copayment rates (20 percent for the 
insured person and for his family’s inpatient care) to an “old boy” retired from 
an employee plan who is too young to qualify for HMSA. Retired workers are 
defined as those who receive Welfare Annuity Plan (WAP) benefits or MAA 
retirement benefits. 
Benefit claims will be paid out of pooled premiums, and the resulting short- 
age will be charged to all employee insurance plans in proportion to payroll 
size. For 1990, HIMA paid ‘Y234 billion and HIMG Y232 billion to RWMS. 
Equivalent amounts were saved by NHI plans, half of which was saved by the 
national government. 
These reforms together shifted Y2  trillion from government budgets to em- 
ployee health insurance taxes in 1990. The amount will easily double in later 
years. 
6.2  Japanese Public Annuity Insurance Plans 
Prior to the 1986 reform, by and large, the coverage of public annuity insur- 
ance plans overlapped with those of public health insurance systems. Kosei- 
Nenkin, or Welfare Annuity Insurance, was the public annuity insurance plan 
for the workers covered by HIMA and HIMG. Kyosai-Kumiai, or mutual aid 
associations, offered their own annuity insurance plans in addition to health 
insurance plans. Kokumin-Nenkin, or the National Pension Plan (NPP), was 
the public annuity insurance plan for self-employed workers and their spouses. 
In contrast to the public health insurance plans, however, public annuity plans 147  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
are centralized and managed by the national government (with MAAs as curi- 
ous exceptions). All benefits are indexed against any inflation greater than 
5 percent annually. 
6.2.1 
The Welfare Annuity Plan (WAP) 
The Welfare Annuity  Plan was created in  1942 as the Worker’s Annuity 
Insurace to provide  annuity  insurance for employed  workers  and  families 
against the loss of their earning capacity due to old age, disability, or death. It 
was the public annuity insurance plan for the households of 27 million workers 
covered by HIMA and HIMG until the 1986 reform (fig. 6.3). In 1990, WAP 
paid Y11.4 trillion in benefits to 10.8 million individuals. Retirement benefits 
accounted for Y8.4  trillion, or 73 percent of the total cost of  WAP benefits. 
Less important are survivor’s benefits, which accounted for 15 percent, partial 
credit benefits, which accounted for 8 percent, and disability annuities, which 
accounted for 3 percent (fig. 6.4). 
Roughly speaking, a worker’s WAP contribution  is determined as a fixed 
percentage,  currently  set  at  14.5 percent  for  male  workers,  of  his  or her 
monthly paycheck, half of which should be paid by the employer (table 6.1). 
Participation  is mandatory  at any site of business  with more than  five  em- 
ployee~.~ 
Retirement benefits started at age 60 for males and age 56 for female work- 
ers, with the condition that the worker be in the system for twenty years or 
more, or for fifteen years or more after the age of 40/35  for maledfemales. 
The basic formula for computing the WAP benefit (in yen) was given by 
y = a X n + b X z X n, 
where a and b are constants, n is the number of months the individual had paid 
the WAP tax, and z is the individual’s revaluated average monthly pay. The last 
value of a was 2,050 (before the 1986 reform took effect), and the value of b 
had been 0.01. The first term (a X n)  was referred to as thejat  benefit, and 
the second term (b  X z X n)  was referred to as the proportional benefit. The 
survivor’s benefit was three-quarters of  the original benefit. The average full 
retirement WAP benefit for those under the old system was Y1,680,000 in 1990. 
The National Pension Plan (NPP) 
This  plan  was  created  in  1961 to  provide  annuity  insurance  for  self- 
employed workers and their spouses against old age, disability, or death. Self- 
employed workers and their spouses between the ages of 20 and 60 were re- 
Public Annuity Insurance Plans under the 1973 Regime 
4.  WAP’s tax base is also referred to as the standard monthly wage, and a worker is classified 
into one of  thirty classes ranging from Y80,OOO to Y570,OOO (in 1989). Unlike the public health 
insurance tax, there is no exemption in the WAP  tax, since anyone earning less than Y80,OOO  is 
classified as earning Y80.000. 148  Seiritsu Ogura 
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Fig. 6.3  JCER projection of participants and recipients of Japanese Welfare 
Annuity Pension plan (1,000 persons) 
Fig. 6.4  Compositions (%) of WAP benefits (1990) 
quired to join the plan, but the dependent spouses of employed workers (who 
are covered by  WAP) were encouraged to join the plan voluntarily (fig. 6.5). 
In 1990, NPP paid Y5  trillion in benefits to 10 million individuals. Eighty per- 
cent of the amount was for the old-age pension, while the partial credit pension 
accounted for 10 percent and the disability pension for 7 percent (fig. 6.6). 149  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
Date  Male (%)  Female (%)  Date  Male (%)  Female (%) 
1942, June  6.4  6.4 
1944, Oct.  11  11 
1947, Sep.  9.4  6.8 
1948, Aug.  3  3 
1960, May  3.5  3 
1965, May  5.5  3.9 





1971, Nov.  6.4  4.8 
1963, Nov.  7.6  5.8 
1966, Aug.  9. I  7.3 
1980, Oct.  10.6  8.9 
1985, Oct.  12.4  11.3 
1990, Jan.  14.3  13.8 
1991, Jan.  14.5  14.3 
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Survivor’s benefits are limited to those with dependent children and hence ac- 
counted for less than 2 per~ent.~ 
Unlike the WAP tax, the NPP tax is a fixed-sum,  monthly  tax, and both 
husband and wife must join NPP, even if only one member of the household is 
working (table 6.2). The NPP retirement benefits started at age 65, compared 
with WAP’s  age 60, and to qualify for NPP benefits  one must pay the NPP 
monthly tax for at least twenty-five years, compared with WAP’s twenty years. 
The formula for computing NPP’s old-age benefits (in yen) was given by 
y=cXn, 
where c is a constant (whose last value was 800 before the 1986 reform), and 
5. At the end of  1985, altogether, there were 25.1 million individuals in NPP, out of which 17.6 
million  were mandatory and 7.5 million voluntary participants. Since the number of  dependent 
spouses of WAP workers is given at 10.9 million, three out of four housewives of WAF’  workers 
were participating in NPP on their own. 150  Seiritsu Ogura 
Fig. 6.6  Compositions (%) of NPP benefits (1990) 
n is the number of  months the individual had paid the NPP tax. In 1985, the 
average size of the existing NPP full old-age pension was Y336,000.h 
Retirement Benefits after the I973 Welfare Reform 
All these plans started as fully funded plans, for they were never intended 
to be tools for transferring income between generations until  1973, when  a 
revolutionary change was brought into WAP in computing the benefits. Prior to 
the change, a worker’s retirement benefit had been based on the mathematical 
average of his actual monthly payments during the insured period. 
Since 1973, however, a worker’s past wages are reevaluated once every five 
years by a set of multipliers that reflect the increases in the market wage that 
have occurred since the last evaluation. The government adopted this change 
to let a “model WAP retirement benefit” pay 60 percent of a worker’s current 
monthly earnings. For NPP, in 1973, the government increased the constant c 
from Y320 to Y800 to provide a pension income of Y50,000 per month for a 
couple who had been in the plan for twenty-five years. 
Since the changes were retroactive, they affected all the existing claims as 
well as future ones. In just two years, the cost of WAP benefit payments tripled, 
while that of NPP quintupled. Later, because of all its revolutionary measures, 
1973 came to be known as the first year of the welfare era. These were meas- 
ures that would require higher rates of subsidization, but the government never 
followed through with sufficient quantities of new funds. It is possible that the 
6.  For those who were already 50 years old or older in 1961 and could not join NPP, the national 
government provides an old-age welfare pension (which should not be confused with the Welfare 
Annuity Plan below) when they reach 70. The sum is about V329,OOO per year, and there are 2 
million recipients. 151  The Cost of  Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
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fiscal crunch after the first oil shock prevented the government from doing so. 
But it is more likely that the government never had a clear idea of what it was 
getting into. The ideas were politically very popular, and the ruling party had 
to grab them to stay in power. 
6.2.2  The NPP Crisis and the National Fiscal Crisis 
The first program to feel the pinch  was the NPP, which had two to three 
times as many recipients for each taxpayer as WAP did (fig. 6.7). Unlike WAP, 
NPP did not have much time to accumulate substantial financial assets, and, as 
a result, NPP taxes had to be raised ten times between 1975 and 1983, to more 
than tenfold the original level, or from W50 to Y5,220 per month (table 6.2). 
The government subsidy had also grown from Y213 billion in  1975 to Y790 
billion in 1982, but it was still too little. Moreover, in 1983, in view of its own 
fiscal crisis, the government declared that it must postpone its NPP subsidy 
payments for the following six years.’ 
It was  also clear that rapid  increases in  insurance fees were eroding the 
NPP’s revenue base very fast and that, before too long, the government would 
have to start contributing substantially more to keep the plan solvent. But, at 
that time,  it did not  even have enough  money  to pay  for the  current com- 
mitment. 
7. One can see how things were getting out of  hand in the following episode: in  1976, in  an 
attempt to increase NPPs cash flow, the government changed the subsidy scheme from half the 
NPP tax revenue to one-third of the cost of NPP benefit payments. In this year, the cost of NPP 
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Fig. 6.7  JCER projections of the numbers of participants per full-benefit 
recipient 
Compared with the situation at NPP, things were not nearly as critical at 
WAP,  but just as serious. At the present moment, WAP does not have a cash- 
flow problem, and, in fact, it will be accumulating considerable surplus cash 
for at least another ten years. Yet, by the early 198Os, the government began to 
admit openly that the measures adopted in 1973  left a monstrous structure that 
may require a 40 percent payroll tax rate in the third decade of the twenty-first 
century. The government, which had to contribute 20 percent of  the cost of 
WAP benefits, saw its subsidy payment jump from Y38 billion in 1972 to YI 24 
billion in 1974 and then to Y595 billion in 1983. In  1986, it would have been 
Y1.2 trillion had the government not postponed paying a quarter of it because 
of the fiscal crisis. 
6.2.3  The 1986 Pension Reforms 
NPP Reforms 
The government solved the short-run problem in the NPP by  infusing sur- 
plus funds from WAP. It replaced what used to be called WAP’sJlat benejit by 
NPP benefits. Formally, NPP’s coverage was extended to those who had been 
covered by  WAP (or MAA’s  annuity plans). In addition, housewives of  em- 
ployed  workers  are  awarded automatic  independent insurance  coverage by 
NPP. With these changes, a new name was given to the NPP benefit, and it is 
now called the basic old-age pension benefit. 
In exchange for this extended coverage, the WAP (and MAAs) is now asked 
to bear a part of the cost of the basic old-age pension benefits net of govern- 
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employed) workers and their dependent spouses, under the new NPP scheme. 
Currently, this share is about 70 percent. The resulting net annual infusion of 
WAP funds into NPP is currently more than Y1 trillion, about the size of total 
NPP tax revenues, or over 10 percent of WAP tax revenues. This will stabilize 
NPP taxes for the next decade or so, at the cost of depleting WAP’s funds. 
To curb the expansion of future basic old-age pension benefits taxes for the 
full 480 months, the annual benefit would be Y626,500 instead of Y950,000, as 
before. This change will be phased in gradually over the fifteen-year period 
beginning in 1992.* 
WAP Reform 
One of the most important ingredients of the 1986 reform was the cut in the 
“proportional part” of the WAP benefit. Namely, the value of the constant b in 
the benefit equation will decrease from  lO/l,OOO  to 7.5/1,000 over twenty 
years, by  approximately 0.125/1,000  for every birth year between 1927 and 
1946. 
On the other hand, the reform that transferred WAP’s flat benefit to the NPP 
seemed to be neutral with respect to the value of the retirement benefit received 
by a married WAP worker. The reform converted one WAP flat benefit into two 
NPP pensions, that is, one for the WAP  worker himself and the other for his 
dependent wife. Even in monetary terms, this seemed to be true; the flat part 
in the old WAP added Y2,472 for every extra month, while the new basic pen- 
sion will (in fifteen years) add only Y1,298 for every extra month. 
In many respects, however, this change implied very substantial cuts in the 
value of WAP benefits. Most affected are unmarried workers or female workers 
without dependent spouses, who will lose almost 50 percent of the original 
WAP  flat benefit. For married workers, WAP’s dependent allowances, which 
used to add Y180,OOO for a dependent wife, will be phased out after the wife 
reaches 65. Moreover, dependent wives of WAP workers who participated in 
the NPP voluntarily will not receive an extra benefit as they had expected, 
other than their own basic old-age pension, while those housewives who had 
not participated in the NPP voluntarily will not be given credit for their hus- 
bands’ WAP coverage prior to 1986. 
Reduction in Government Subsidies 
After this reform, the government discontinued its subsidy to WAP  of  20 
percent of WAP benefits. Instead, it now contributes a third of the cost of the 
basic old-age pension benefits, as it did for NPP. This change in the subsidy 
8. More precisely, the new NPP benefit formula after the  1986 reform is given by 
y  = 626,500 X dv, 
where n is the number of months one had paid NPP taxes, and v is the policy parameter standing 
for the  maximum number of covered months. For those born  in  1926, v is set at  300 for every 
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scheme will save the government a considerable amount of  money  since an 
average WAP benefit claim (u1,436,000)  was 4.5 times as large as an NPP 
claim (Y336,OOO). By converting  one WAP subsidy into two NPP subsidies 
(namely, for a husband and wife), the government can save a quarter of an NPP 
claim, or about Y80,000, since 
0.2 X 4.5 -  0.333 X 2 X  1 = 0.23. 
The change also saves the government money because the new subsidy starts 
at age 65, which is five years later than the start of WAP benefits. In the 1986 
reform, however, the government could not postpone the start of the WAP ben- 
efit itself from age 60 to age 65. For the moment, a retiree between the ages 
60 and 65 is receiving essentially  the  same amount as a person receiving a 
basic pension benefit with dependent allowances and a WAF’  retirement benefit 
as a special WAP benefit  entirely at the  expense of  WAP.  The government 
wanted to phase this benefit out by the year 2022, but the WAP reform bill 
submitted to the Diet in 1989 met strong political opposition and was passed 
without this part. 
6.3  What Our (Children’s) Future Will Look Like 
In general, it is difficult to predict what it will be like even ten years from 
now. Consider the case of medical costs as a good example. First of all, medical 
technology can change. So much medical research is carried out all over the 
world, and researchers may very well change the fundamental medical tech- 
nologies and the cost structure of  health care in the near future. Second, institu- 
tions can change. The medical industry is far from perfectly competitive. It 
has a very strong professional union and an equally determined government. 
Almost all its demand is derived from public health insurance plans. Its supply 
is rigidly regulated by government at all levels. Any substantial change in these 
institutional factors is bound to have its effect on future medical costs. 
Rather than trying to make an uneducated guess regarding how these factors 
change over time, I assume that these factors remain constant. After all, what 
we want to find out is not so much the absolute size of the medical cost for the 
elderly in years to come as its size relative to what the working generation will 
be earning then. 
6.3.1  The Population Allocation Model 
As a first approximation to our future, I project it directly on the economic 
and sociological structure of our present society. Consider a world where, for 
example, a future 40-year-old man earns exactly the same amount of money as 
today’s 40-year-old man, In that world, he marries at the same age and nas just 
as many children. His family gets ill just as often, his doctor is just as expen- 
sive, and his wife even goes back to work just as often. When his children 
finish school, they will start working too, just as today’s  youngsters  do. His 
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Demographic Disaggregation 
Since our concern here is aging and its social costs, it is natural to disaggre- 
gate our population by biological ages. In many aspects, however, there seem 
to be substantial differences between the two sexes, and we have to differenti- 
ate our population by sex, too. Ideally, we would like to disaggregate our popu- 
lation both by age and by sex. I express this disaggregation by  sedage. 
Unfortunately, most  vital  and  social statistics are available only for age 
groups rather than for each age. For these variables, I use almost exclusively 
the following demographic groupings for each sex: 0-4,  5-9,  10-14,  15-19, 
70-74,75-79,  80-84,  85-89,90+.  To save space, I use sedage-group to ex- 
press this disaggregation. 
The Demographic Structure 
I start from the sedage profile of  the  1986 population. Each year, I take 
account of  how many babies of  each sex are born and how many  men and 
women die at each age and then construct a new age profile for the next year. 
The number of new births is obtained by multiplying the female population 
in each of the following reproductive age groups by  its rate of  reproduction, 
taken from the 1989 Vital Statistics. According to it, an adult female gives birth 
to 1.52 children in her life at the rate of 0.047 per year between the ages of 20 
and 24,0.146 between 25 and 29,0.091 between 30 and 34, and 0.019 between 
35 and 39. 
The number of deaths in each sedage group is obtained by multiplying each 
sedage-group population by  its mortality rate, taken from the 1986 Vital Sta- 
tistics (fig. 6.8). 
The Employment Structure 
Every year, the Ministry of Welfare publishes the State of Affairs of Workers 
Covered by Health Insurance, which reports a number of  sample statistics on 
the workers covered by  HIMA and HIMG. Contained in this report are the 
nu.mber of workers and their average monthly pay in each sex/age group. From 
the 1988 sample figures for each system, I obtained estimates of the number 
of workers of each sedage group in each system. 
As for the workers in the public sector who are covered by MAAs, there is 
no consolidated report. I had to rely on the Labor Force Survey compiled by 
the Management and Coordination Agency for the 1986 sex/age-group decom- 
position of these workers. 
20-24,  25-29,  30-34,  35-39,  40-44,  45-49,  50-54,  55-59,  60-64,  65-69, 
Injow. I compute the number of workers coming into the system each year for 
two entry-level age groups, namely, ages 15-19  and 20-24.  I assume that the 
numbers of people entering the system are fixed proportions of the general 
population of these two sex/age groups given in table 6.3. As for the new work- 
ers in the public sector, I assume that the absolute numbers are fixed for each 
sex/age group rather than their shares of the population. 156  Seiritsu Ogura 
Fig. 6.8  Mortality rates for Japanese population (1989) 
Table 6.3  Fraction of the Population Working in HIMA and HIMG and the 
Number of Workers in MAA 



















Outjlow.  I then subtract the number of  workers leaving the system by multi- 
plying the “net dropout rate” of each sexlage group by the stock of workers in 
that group. This rate can be loosely interpreted as the probability of a worker 
of  a given sexlage dropping out of the system during the next year. To obtain 
these rates, first I observe the proportional rate of  change in the number of 
workers moving up from one age group to the next older one in five years, 
adjusted for the change in the system’s overall employment level during the 
period. 
I have computed two such sets over two consecutive five-year periods, one 
from 1975 to 1980, and another from 1980 to 1985, and averaged them. Such 
important behaviors as changing jobs, temporarily retiring for family reasons, 
or permanently retiring due to old age are presumably reflected in these fig- 
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Fig. 6.9  Net dropout rates (HIMA) 
Dependents in Each System 
The Ministry of Welfare reports cited above also contain the sex/age-group 
relations between workers and their dependents, which can be transformed into 
the following matrix: the (i, j)th element of this matrix shows what percentage 
of dependents in thejth age group are supported by  1 percent of the workers 
in the ith age group who are in a particular program. Multiplying the ith row 
by the share of this program in the number of workers in the ith age group of 
any year and summing over the rows will give the age-group profile of  the 
dependents supported by the workers of the system. 
Since there is a matrix for each of the four possible combinations of work- 
ers’ and dependents’ sexes (i.e., male/female supported by male/female), this 
procedure must be repeated four times each year. I then add male dependents 
supported by  male workers to those supported by  female workers and obtain 
the age-group profile of male dependents. Likewise, by adding female depen- 
dents supported by male workers to those supported by female workers, I ob- 
tain the age-group profile of female dependents. 
For public-sector employees, I adjusted the matrices of HIMA by a common 
factor to obtain the same total number of dependents for 1986. The same pro- 
cedure as above is then followed for each year. 
6.3.2  Medical Costs 
Medical Costs of  Each SedAge Group 
Since  our  population  allocation  model  differentiates  male/female  and 
workeddependent for each age group, ideally one would like to have medical 
information on these four different groups, as is the case for HIMA. For the 
rest, however, I had to do with the available cost figures; for example, for 158  Seiritsu Ogura 
HIMG cost computations, I use a common  set of costs for male and female 
workers in the same age group and another set for male and female dependents 
in the same age group. 
Since no consolidated  benefit  report  is published  for MAAI,  I averaged 
HIMA and HIMG rates for each sex/age group and adjusted them by a com- 
mon factor until I obtained the total medical expenditure on MAAI individuals 
for 1989. 
Medical Cost Allocation Models 
According to the structure of each health insurance plan outlined at the be- 
ginning of this paper, the medical cost allocation model divides the (estimated 
future) medical costs of  the covered individuals of a given system into four 
parts:  the part that patients pay,  the part that governments  pay,  the part that 
other systems pay,  and the part that the system itself pays. Each system then 
adds all the costs charged to it and subtracts the government  subsidies to it. 
The difference between the two will have to be raised by insurance taxes. The 
model also computes the payroll of  the covered workers, and the tax rate will 
be determined. For the NHI system, the per capita premium is computed. 
6.3.3  The Cost of Public Retirement Benefits 
The Welfare Annuity Plan (WAP)  Model 
Existing benejits. The Social Insurance Agency’s 1989  Annual Report provides 
a sexlage breakdown of the retired workers who are receiving WAP benefits as 
well as the distribution of the number of covered years among old-age annuity 
recipients of each sex. From these two sets of  statistics, I estimated the average 
size of existing old-age annuities for each sedage group. 
The number of recipients is then reduced each year by the expected number 
of deaths in each sedage group. Each deceased male recipient is replaced by 
five-sevenths of a female spouse, who then receives three-quarters of the origi- 
nal annuity as a survivor’s benefit until her death. I ignored the possibility of a 
male  spouse claiming  a survivor’s benefit.  The Annual Report  cited  above, 
however, does not  allow one to construct an age-group profile of  survivor’s 
benefit recipients, and 1 simply depreciate the total cost of  the existing survi- 
vor’s benefit at the rate of  14.3 percent per year. 
New benejits.  One-fifth of the HIMA/HIMG workers who were in the 55-59 
and 60-64  age groups during the previous period and who drop out of HIMA/ 
HIMG employment in the current period are counted as recipients of the WAP 
special benefit during that period. In the next period, they will move to regular 
WAP benefits  with basic old-age pensions.  Older workers  who drop out of 
employment during the period are added directly to the group receiving regular 
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To  estimate the future WAP benefits for the new recipients, it is necessary 
to estimate their average number of years covered by WAP and their lifetime 
average wages. As to the number of covered years, I projected that it will in- 
crease from 32.5 years in 1989 to 34.9 years in 2019 for new male recipients 
and from 26.5 years in 1989 to 30.3 years in 2019 for new female recipients. 
After 2019, the length of  coverage will increase only very slightly for both 
sexes. At this moment, however, this projectionis based on an ad hoc computa- 
tion carried outside the simulation model, using the cross-distribution tables 
of number of covered months and age/sex of WAP workers (contained in De- 
partment of Public Pensions [  19861) and their assumed differential entry/quit 
probabilities. The lifetime wage profile is approximated by starting from the 
average wage for 55-59  age group and going down the age structure until a 
sufficient number of years are obtained to match the number of covered years. 
The NPP Model 
NPP participants’ sedage-group structure.  The relationship  between NPP 
and NHI is far weaker than the relation between WAP and HIMA/HIMG be- 
cause monthly NPP tax payments are handled by  individual passbooks inde- 
pendently whereas WAP and HIMAMIMG taxes are automatically withheld 
from workers’ paychecks at the same time. Nevertheless, information about 
the NPP participants’ sedage structure is very scarce, and I have to rely on the 
NHI sedage-group data. 
According to my estimation of each sex, there are approximately 11 million 
individuals between the ages 20 and 59 who should be participating in NHI 
and NPP. Out of these individuals, from each sex, about 10 million participate 
in NHI and 9 million in NPP. Since the coverage of NPP is essentially identical 
to that of NHI, and in the absence of  direct information, in order to estimate 
the NPP sedage-group structure one must rely on NHI sedage-group data. 
But the NHI data contain workers who are “old boys” or “old girls” of HIMA/ 
HIMG or their dependents who are in the RWMS. Since these people are un- 
likely to join NPP, I subtracted them from the NHI participants and multiplied 
the NHI data by the factor 0.9 to obtain the NPP sedage structure for 1989. 
NPP benefits: Existing NPP benefits.  The 1989 Annual Report cited above 
gives the sedage-group profile of NPP recipients and the size distribution of 
NPP benefits separately. I assume that all NPP benefits are identical regardless 
of  age group  in  each  sex and  that  the  male  recipient’s benefit  is fixed at 
Y385,700 and the female recipient’s benefit at Y368,300. In each sedage group, 
I then depreciate the total of these benefits each year by the mortality rate. The 
average size of  current benefits suggests that the current NPP recipients had 
paid NPP taxes for only 55 percent of the months that they had been presum- 
ably covered, or for about twenty-two years of a forty-year base, which is not 
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NPP  benefits: Future NPP  benefits.  The surviving participants of the  1989 
NPP sedage-group structure who enter the 65-69  age group are counted as 
new recipients of the old-age benefit in this period. According to my projec- 
tion, the fraction of the months that the new retirees will have paid the taxes 
will increase steadily over the next thirty years, but only to around 0.7, or to 
twenty-eight years, which will barely exceed the minimum twenty-five years 
required. 
Compared with private annuity contracts, the NPP no longer looks attrac- 
tive. Its annual costs now exceed HOO,OOO, and, for each “paid” year, its annu- 
ity will increase by less than Y16,OOO. Younger people can do far better in the 
private capital market. In fact, for the last two years, registered NPP partici- 
pants have paid only a little more than 80 percent of the taxes due. In addition, 
as a result of repeated increases in NPP taxes, now there is a significant number 
of “poor” individuals who are exempt from NPP taxes. Their share of the popu- 
lation is about 15 per~ent.~ 
6.4  Simulation Results 
6.4.1  Demographic Changes 
In order to give an idea of the speed and the degree of aging in the Japanese 
economy, three sets of figures are produced. One set of figures (fig. 6.10) shows 
the 1986 distribution of population across sedage groups and insurance sys- 
tems. Another set (fig. 6.11) shows the situation early in the next century, just 
before the baby boomers begin to retire. The third set (fig. 6.12) shows the 
population in 2019 at its most aged state, when there will be almost as many 
women older than 60 as younger than 20. The distribution of the population 
over more aggregated groups is given in table 6.4 for these three years. 
6.4.2  Medical Costs 
Absorption of Medical Care 
No less dramatic is the change in the absorption of medical care. Figure 6.13 
shows the shares of the medical care resources absorbed by  each age group 
(both sexes combined) in  1989, regardless of who paid the costs. The top of 
the hill appears to be around the 60-64  age group, but it is a low hill. The baby 
boom generation is in the 40-44  age group and causes no alarm at this stage. 
Things look a little serious in 2004, but still manageable (fig. 6.14). The baby 
boomers are in the 55-59  age group, and their costs are just starting to show. 
Things look extremely  serious in  2024 (fig. 6.15), when the baby boomers 
9. I assumed that the ratio of n to  w in r years will be given by 
p  = 0.55 X (30 -  r)/30 + 0.7 X r/30, 
which I multiply by 625,000 by p  to obtain the average NPP  value. 161  The Cost of  Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
Fig. 6.10  Population pyramid and its distribution to health insurance 
programs (1989) 
appear as a steep mountain in the 70-74  age group. In 2024, in fact, the retired 
collectively consume more medical care than the working generation and their 
children, compared to 43 percent in 1986. 
Table 6.5 gives the medical costs for each super age group in these three 
years (age groupings here are more aggregated than the standard one.) Need- 
less to say, they are expressed in 1989 prices. According to this table, in 2004, 
the national medical expenditure will be about 30 percent higher than in 1989, 
and, in 2024, it will be about 1.5 times the 1989 size. 
Allocution of  Medical Costs 
Given the bulging medical costs of the aged in coming years, how are they 
going to be paid if we maintain the present system of public medical insur- 162  Seiritsu Ogura 
Fig. 6.11  Population pyramid and its distribution to health insurance 
programs (2004) 
ance? I distinguish three different sources of payment: (i) government subsid- 
ies, (ii) patients’ direct payments, and (iii) insurance taxes. Figure 6.16 shows 
the allocation of  the national medical costs to these three sources under the 
present system. In  1989, about 25 percent of  all medical costs are paid by 
governments from general tax revenue funds, and the share will increase by 
about 5 percentage points by  2024. 
Insurance taxes paid slightly less than 60 percent in  1989, and the share 
will decrease by about 5 percentage points by 2024. Nevertheless, because the 
increase in the national medical expenditure will be accompanied by a decline 
in employment, employee insurance tax rates will have to be about 1.5 times 
the current levels by  2024. Close to 50 percent of  the taxes imposed on the 163  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
Fig. 6.12  Population pyramid and its distribution to health insurance 
programs (2019) 
working generation will go to support HMSA and RWMS as a part of financing 
the medical costs of the aged. 
The Effects of  the 1983-84  Reforms 
The effects of HMSA (and RWMS to a lesser degree) can be clearly seen 
by comparing figure 6.16 with figure 6.17, which represents the cost allocation 
under the old  system. Without the reform, in  1986, government subsidies 
would have paid about Y2.5 trillion more, or almost 15 percentage points more 
in terms of relative share. In 2024, the amount of money charged to the govern- 
ment would have been 60 percent more than under the present system, or close 
to 50 percent of  all medical costs of that year. The cost charged to insurance 164  Seiritsu Ogura 
Table 6.4  JCER Population Projection, 1991 (in thousands of persons) 
Year  0-19  20-39  40-59  60-79  80+  Total 
Male: 
1989  16,964  17,326  17,341  7,891  966  60,488 
(0.138)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.064)  (0.008)  (0.491) 
2004  13,621  17,902  17,184  12,378  1,502  62,587 
(0.107)  (0.141)  (0.135)  (0.097)  (0.012)  (0.491) 
2019  12,399  13,772  17,358  13,701  2,552  59,782 
(0.102)  (0.113)  (0.142)  (0.112)  (0.021)  (0.49) 
Female: 
I989  16,130  16,914  17,601  10,207  1,764  62,6 16 
(0.13  1)  (0.137)  (0.143)  (0.083)  (0.014)  (0.509) 
2004  12,904  17,165  17,254  14,337  3,127  64,787 
(0.10  1)  (0.135)  (0.135)  (0.113)  (0.025)  (0.509) 
2019  11,742  13,159  17.02 1  15,787  4,456  62,165 
(0.096)  (0.108)  (0.14)  (0.129)  (0.037)  (0.51) 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are the proportion of  each age group/sex in total  national popu- 
lation. 
taxes,  on  the  other hand,  would  have  been  relatively  stable  under  the  old 
system. 
6.4.3  Public Pension Costs 
Using simulation models as described in Ogura (1993),  I have computed the 
costs of NPP benefits and WAP benefits as well as MAA retirement benefits. 
NPP participants are computed as a fixed proportion of NHI participants, while 
participants in HIMA and HIMG are collectively  regarded as WAP partici- 
pants, even though some may not qualify for the pension benefits in both pro- 
grams owing to the extraordinarily long vesting period  of  twenty-five years. 
MAAs provide both health insurance and retirement benefits  for all public- 
sector employees and hence are treated as identical in terms of participants. 
Cost of  NPP 
In 1989, the total cost of NPP benefits was Y3.1 trillion, of which the old- 
age pension benefits accounted for Y2.5 trillion. According to the simulation 
results, the total cost of NPP benefits will go up to Y5.7 trillion in 2019 and 
will come down slowly thereafter. During the same period, the number of NPP 
pension benefit recipients will increase from 7.6 to 11.4 million. These num- 
bers do not include the WAP workers and their dependent spouses, to whom 
the  1986 reform  extended  mandatory  coverage.  The voluntary  participants 
prior  to  1989 are  assumed  to  receive  their  basic  old-age  pension  benefits 
from WAP. Fig. 6.13  Medical costs in 1989 Fig. 6.14  Medical costs in 2004 Fig. 6.15  Medical costs in 2024 168  Seiritsu Ogura 
Table 6.5  Annual Medical Cost Projection (in 1989 billion yen) 
Age 
Year  0-19  20-39  40-59  60-79  80+  Total 
1989  145  234  489  623  251  1.149 
2004  111  252  508  956  450  2,271 
2024  83  175  506  1,05  1  726  2,541 
(0.08)  (0.13)  (0.28)  (0.36)  (0.15)  (  1  .OO) 
(0.05)  (0.11)  (0.22)  (0.42)  (0.20)  (  1  .OO) 
(0.03)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.41)  (0.29)  (1.00) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the proportion of each age group in national health care costs. 
Fig. 6.16  Allocation of medical costs 
Costs of  the WAP and MAA 
In 1989, the total cost of WAP benefits was Y10 trillion, including the basic 
old-age annuity. It should go up to Y21  trillion, or more than twice the present 
cost, in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Of this amount, about a 
third (u7 trillion) will be for the basic old-age annuity. The increase in cost 
will be primarily  due to the increase in the number of  full benefit recipients 
from 7 million to over 14 million individuals during this period. 
In 1989, MAA paid almost Y7 trillion in retirement benefits. The cost will 
increase to Y9  trillion at the end of this century, but it will start declining there- 169  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
Fig. 6.17  Allocation of medical costs (old system) 
after to less than half the present level in the middle of the next century, if the 
current low level of hiring persists in the public sector. Currently, MAA is in 
the worst shape of all the public pension programs for employed workers. The 
present level of benefits is already more than 40 percent of the total payroll of 
the workers in the public sector. 
Effects of  the I986 Reforms 
I also computed how much the benefits would cost in 2021 had we kept the 
system prior to the 1986 reform. The combined costs of WAP and MAA bene- 
fits would reach Y38  trillion instead of Y31  trillion in 2034 (fig. 18a), and the 
cost of NPP benefits would reach Y8.2 trillion instead of Y5.7 trillion in 2019 
(fig. 6.18b).  Therefore, without the 1986 reform, in 2019, the total cost of NPP, 
WAP,  and MAA would be W6 trillion instead of Y36.7 trillion. 
Thus, the 1986 reform will reduce the combined costs by more than 30 per- 
cent. As was pointed out earlier, the savings in NPP costs come from both the 
cut in the unit NPP benefit and the de facto cancellation of 7 million voluntary 
participants’ claims that will be “paid” by WAP. The savings in the WAP cost 
come from the one-quarter cut in the “proportional” benefit and the implicit 
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Fig. 6.18  (A) Comparison of pre-1986 and post-1986 systems: WAP and MAA 
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6.5  Concluding Remarks 
6.5.1  Magnitude of the Costs 
In fiscal year 1986, the Japanese national medical expenditure was estimated 
at Y17 trillion, or 6.4 percent of the national income that year. Of this amount, 
only Y2  trillion was paid directly out of patients’ pockets, and the rest paid out 
of government budgets and by  public medical insurance plans. In the same 
year, Y16.6 trillion, or 6.3 percent of national income, was paid out as benefits 
of public annuity insurances, of which WAP and NPP together accounted for 
two-thirds. 
Population aging will increase these costs over the next several decades. The 
peak will come around the year 2021, when the national medical expenditure 
will be close to 50 percent higher, at around Y25 trillion. At the same time, the 
costs of the benefits of all public annuity plans may well exceed Y35 trillion if 
we maintain the current system of starting the retirement benefits at age 60 for 
employees. Figure 6.19 shows estimates of future combined costs of all public 
pension costs and national medical costs, as well as the costs of all public 
pension  costs alone, in the  first half  of  the next century. According  to this 
figure, the combined costs will increase from  Y40 trillion in 1994 to Y60 trillion 
in the second decade of the next century (both figures are given in 1989 yen). 
While these costs increase, the size of our labor force will shrink, along with 
the tax base of our social insurance in real terms, as can be seen clearly from 
the estimates of the employees’ payroll in the same figure. Thus, medical costs 
and retirement benefit costs will either absorb or transfer about one-quarter of 
national income, or twice their current share. 
6.5.2  Reforms in the 1980s 
If  this simulation model is correct, the  1986 pension reform has reduced 
NPP’s long-run cost by Y2.5  trillion and WAP’s long-run cost by Y7  trillion. 
This amounts to a cut of 30 percent. It also reduced the government’s subsidy 
to WAP.  On the other hand, the  1984-85  medical insurance reforms simply 
redistributed the medical costs of the old from the government budgets to em- 
ployee insurance plans. 
These reforms have left us a fiscal structure that depends too heavily on 
social  insurance  taxes.  In  1986, the  revenue  from  social  insurance  taxes 
reached Y28.7  trillion, compared with Y42.1  trillion of national  general tax 
revenue. The share of the social insurance taxes will keep on ballooning as the 
expanding costs of public annuity plans are scheduled to be financed mainly 
by  annuity insurance  taxes, and the combined social insurance tax rates of 
future working generations will easily be in  excess of 50 percent.  In figure 
6.20, I computed the necessary payroll tax rate to maintain health insurance 
programs and keep all public pension programs on a pay-as-you-go basis for 
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Fig. 6.19  Effects of aging on Japanese public pension costs and medical costs 
(JCER projection) 
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Fig. 6.20  JCER projection of combined health and pension insurance tax rates 
rate will be close to 40  percent, or double the current rate, and still increasing 
for another twenty years. 
6.5.3  Future Reforms 
There are two problems that need to be resolved in these programs. One is 
the size of the burden of these programs itself. It still is too much for future 
working generations. In order to provide economic incentives for the supply of 
labor and capital, it would be wise to trim the costs of these programs further. 173  The Cost of Aging: Public Finance Perspectives for Japan 
In  fact, these programs still contain substantial fat. When being old was 
synonymous with being poor, providing free medical care and generous public 
annuity benefits might have been a desirable policy for achieving distributional 
justice. But now there are rich old people and poor old people. One can say 
that the present benefit structure of these programs does not try to direct bene- 
fits toward relatively needy old people. One may  even say that the present 
public annuity provides very regressive benefits; rich old people receive more 
benefits because of longer coverage and better pay. An attempt must be made 
to relax the very stringent vesting period and make the benefit schedule a more 
progressive one, as is the case in the United States. 
In the working generation, there are rich people and poor people, and, as a 
tax borne by  them, a social insurance tax is far from ideal. Typically, it is a 
linear tax on labor income between the lower and the upper limits. Compared 
with the personal income tax, it is far less progressive, and its tax base is much 
narrower, as the projected future tax rate shows. For low-income households, 
it provides little or no exemption but imposes a fixed-sum tax. For high-income 
households, it becomes another fixed-sum tax. In these regions, it is regressive. 
Income transfer between generations has become an essential part of  any of 
these social insurance programs. Financing them primarily by such imperfect 
taxes is a very questionable proposition. 
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